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Abstract
This paper argues that currently advanced, aging economies experienced a qualitative change
in the role of public education during the process of industrialization. In the early phases of
the Industrial Revolution, public education was regarded as a duty that regulated child labor
and thereby discouraged childbirth. As these economies developed and the population aged,
younger generations came to view public education as a right, whereas older generations desirous
of other public services became more politically inuential. The eventual policy bias in favor
of the elderly placed a heavier education burden on the young, inducing them to have fewer
children. This vicious cycle between population aging and the undersupply of public education
may have decelerated the growth of advanced economies in the last few decades.
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1 Introduction
This study hypothesizes that the origin of population aging, pervasive in developed economies,
dates back to the educational reforms during the era of the Industrial Revolution. We argue that
the qualitative e¤ect on fertility of education policy changed with the individual stances on public
education. In the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, investment in human capital was not
desirable for low-income households needing child labor. Compulsory education thus worked as
a dutythat regulated child labor and thereby discouraged childbirth. By contrast, in the later
phases of the Industrial Revolution, younger generations came to regard education investment as
desirable. That is, public education was desired as a right. The undersupply of public education
in the postwar period placed the nancial burden of child education on households, and thereby
discouraged childbirth.
A question to be raised is how public schooling arose and which factors have a¤ected subsequent
education policies. To tackle this question, the present article highlights demographic factors as the
determinants of social spending, for currently advanced economies over the modern period. Until
the early 19th century, population expansion gradually raised the demand for a public education
system by promoting skill- (age-) biased technological progress. In the postwar period, on the other
hand, older generations, who have increased their population share and political representation,
have sought national resources for their own well-being.1
In fact, one of the postwar aging societies, Japan, has improved the relative well-being of the
elderly in some respects.2 Figure 1 plots the trends in population aging (the dotted line) and the
allocation of public spending between the young and the old (the solid line). Noting that old-age
and education expenditures are both in per capita terms, one nds that the public service allocation
1 In the U.S., for example, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and the National Council on
Aging (NCOA) increased their political power in the 1960s (Longman, 1987, p. 234). According to a recent article of
The Economist (2005), the AARP has by far the largest members (35 millions) among the politically active groups
in the country.
2There is some evidence for other countries. Pampel (1994) conducts econometric analysis by using the 19591986
annual data for 18 advanced industrial democracies. The result shows that, in the absence of class-based corporatism
and strong leftist parties, a large aged population tends to exacerbate age inequality in public spending in favor of the
elderly. Preston (1984) shows that the aged American society reduced poverty among the elderly by the expansion
of social security benets in contrast to raising poverty among children. Poterba (1997, 1998), using the U.S. panel
data over the 19601990 period, nds that an increase in the fraction of the elderly in a jurisdiction is associated
with a signicant reduction in per-child education spending. For earlier periods, the regression results of Lindert
(1994), based on the 18801930 panel of 21 (mostly currently advanced) countries, indicate that aged countries
tend to have large public spending on social transfers including pension and health subsidies, and low primary- and
secondary-school enrollment rates.
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is shifting over the period in favor of the elderly. Such a trend would be attributed in large part to
increased political pressures from retiring workers and pensioners.
These arguments assert that demographic changes and public policies have interacted with
each other in the process of industrialization. In particular, developed economies may experience
a vicious cycle between social aging and the undersupply of public education, possibly leading to
a population decline and a slowdown in economic growth.3 This spiral can therefore be one of the
potential forces for the postwar convergence across advanced economies. The main objective of this
paper is to develop a theoretical framework to understand the socioeconomic structures of such
phenomena and to consider its policy implications.
The growth theory developed features ve properties deserving special attention. First, parents
face a trade-o¤between the quantity and quality of children, as shown in standard models of fertility
and education such as Becker et al. (1990) and Galor and Weil (2000).4 Second, public and private
education are substitutes for each other in terms of skill acquisition. Those two properties together
generate a potential link between education policy and fertility: in response to the undersupply
of public education, for instance, parents may spend more on private education by having fewer
children. Third, public education compulsorily takes away the time children have for paid work.
Hence, their forgone wages equal the opportunity costs of child education. Fourth, technological
progress is assumed to be skill- (age-) biased. This improves the productivity of adult workers over
that of children, and thus makes sending children to school more benecial than having them work.5
Finally, older generations prefer social services that directly and immediately benet themselves,
such as pensions and social security, over public education. This leads to age-cohort di¤erences in
the willingness to enlarged education policy.6
3The undersupply of public education does not necessarily mean a decline in public expenditures for education
per pupil. Indeed, it means that the provision of public education becomes insu¢ cient for the given level of economic
development.
4This paper extends the unied growth theory developed by Galor and Weil (2000), who explore the transition from
Malthusian stagnation to modern growth through the demographic transition. In contrast to their representative-
agent model, this article takes a political economy approach in analyzing the demographic trend since the early
Industrial Revolution. The extended model also allows for the other four properties discussed.
5A similar mechanism is proposed by Hazan and Berdugo (2002). However, their single-agent model makes no
distinction between public education and private education.
6Using the American National Election Survey for 1988, Vinovskis (1993, pp. 202209) nds that additional federal
assistance for public schools is supported by 77.1 % of interviewees aged through 1829, and only by 46.9 % of those
aged 70 and above. Furthermore, his multiple classication analysis based on the same data reveals that, after
controlling for the e¤ects of other factors (such as sex, race, education, family income and so on), there remains the
tendency of the elderly to oppose federal funding for public schools.
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This paper also establishes a more solid foundation for the recent and growing literature on
demographic change and macroeconomics. It appears that no established theory has examined the
interrelationship between public education, private education and fertility, despite its importance
for the assessment of education policy. As discussed below, while there are three related seminal
theories, these can be interpreted as partial theories from the perspective of this research, in that
none encompasses the rise and fall of education policy over the long term.
First, Galor and Moav (2006) demonstrate the mechanism of the birth of public schooling on
the course of industrialization. Unlike this research, however, their growth theory analyzes the
monotonic evolution of education policy, excluding the possibility of its aggravation in mature
development stages. Their model also assumes away demographic changes so as to highlight the
prot rates of capitalists as a key determinant in their policy preferences. The current study
takes the opposite approach by omitting physical capital to highlight the demographic factors.
Furthermore, in their scenario, educational reform occurs without any political conict in sharp
contrast to this analysis, which emphasizes compulsory education as a duty for the poor.7
Second, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) explore the mechanism of child labor legislation. By noting
the interaction between the number of children per family and policy preferences, they show the
possibility of multiple equilibria such that child labor may or may not be abolished. Whereas
their attention is directed at underdeveloped stages, the present study builds on a longer-term
perspective, and encompasses more development stages where population aging provokes political
confrontation between generations.
Third and nally, Holtz-Eakin et al. (2004) develop a growth model where the fraction of the
elderly population is a prime determinant of government spending on education.8 They demonstrate
that a fertility decline alters the policy preferences of the median voter in favor of the elderly.
However, unlike the present article, their analysis leaves unexplored an opposing causality between
population aging and education policy. This is because their model abstracts from the family
strategies of child rearing by assuming exogenous fertility and no private education.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents historical evidence
7This di¤erence is largely owing to the fact that the present article highlights the role of compulsory education
as a child labor regulation. As evidenced in Section 2, early factory legislation required education for child workers
while limiting their work hours.
8Similar demographic approaches are employed in Kemnitz (1999), Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999) and Gradstein
and Kaganovich (2004). All of these, however, assume exogenous population growth.
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supporting the central argument of the paper. Section 3 describes the basic structure of the model
and then solves the optimization problems. This section also derives the political equilibrium that
determines the allocation of public spending between generations. Section 4, as the main part of
the paper, conducts a dynamic analysis to demonstrate the evolution of the economy. Further,
it indicates the possibility for a slowdown in economic growth in the developed stage. Section 5
concludes the discussion and addresses some possible modications and extensions to the research.
The description of the data used and the proofs of the technical results are provided in the Appendix.
2 Historical Evidence
This section presents historical and empirical evidence supporting the central thesis of the paper.
The focus here is placed on the experiences of advanced economies Japan, the United States, and
Western Europe over the last two centuries. Consistent with the theory developed below, it shows
that industrialization forces triggered the decisive shift of individualsattitudes toward child labor
and education.
2.1 Public Education as a Duty
The notion of compulsory education as a duty has been embraced by the poor, who live from hand
to mouth and need the earnings of their children. In the early stages of their industrial revolutions,
these countries employed children, and their respective child labor regulations and educational
reforms were not embraced by the lower class. As a result of compromise, early educational reforms
were designed to provide special classes for working children. Consistent with this observation, the
growth theory developed here encompasses the coexistence of child labor and public schooling.
2.1.1 Japan
It is widely recognized that the Japanese industrial revolution took place after the Meiji Restoration
in 1868. Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1965, p. 66; 1978, p. 142) argue that modern economic growth
began in the mid-1880s. Similarly, Rostow (1978, p. 425) dates the years 18851905 as the period
of the take-o¤.
Japans modern educational reform was launched with the proclamation of the Educational Sys-
tem Order in 1872, which aimed for egalitarian education by establishing school districts throughout
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the country.9 The law made four-year elementary education compulsory, along with the charging
of school fees (Taira, 1978, p. 196). An educational system in the early stages of development such
as this placed a heavy nancial burden on the lower classes at that time. As described by Taira
(ibid.), To poor farmers, compulsory education appeared as an encouragement to the children
to loaf in school when they could be helping on the farm. In some poorer parts of Japan there
were a number of riots against compulsory education, in which hundreds of school buildings were
destroyed.
In fact, statistical records indicate that not many children were sent to primary school in the
early years of industrialization. The classroom attendance rate was approximately 20.44% in 1873
and 31.24% in 1890, and exceeded 50% for the rst time in 1900 (Japan National Commission for
UNESCO, 1966, p. 64).10 Poor classroom attendance might have even been observed in not only
day schools, but also night schools, which allowed children to work during the day. A public survey
reports that among 4043 pupils registered in primary night schools (run by the city of Tokyo) in
1927, about 74% dropped out before graduation (Ishii, 1992, p. 165).
The low attendance rates were a result of the economic dependence of poor households on child
labor. According to the Annual Report of Factory Inspection, even in 1926 nearly 20% of workers
in textile mills were aged 16 or less (Ayusawa, 1966, pp. 186188). Saito (1996, pp. 8789) argues
that, while child employment in paid work was not as extensive as in Britain, Japanese children
were mostly expected to support their parents in the elds or around the house.
In order to encourage education for child workers, some forms of half time education were
introduced in the late 19th century. In 1875, the city of Tokyo permitted night classes opened by
private elementary schools, and in 1876 permitted night classes by public elementary schools (Ishii,
1992, p. 25). In 1894, the Ministry of Education ordered local governments to develop special
curriculums for children who could not attend regular classes, and subsequently night classes,
Sunday schools, and special classes for children involved in the care of babies were opened by state
9See the webpage of the Ministry of Education:
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpbz198103/index.html
where the history of Japans modern educational system is documented comprehensively. According to Dore (1964,
p. 176), although there were many small schools for reading, writing and arithmetic before the Meiji Restoration,
they were typically run privately with no subsidies from the government.
10While the commission also reports the rate of school attendance, they believe that the rate of classroom attendance
provides more accurate information about actual attendance: the former is dened as an o¢ cial ratio of the number
of children attending school to the total number of the school-age children,whereas the latter is the ratio of average
daily attendance to the total number of the school-age children (ibid., p. 6465).
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schools and sometimes by factories (Saito, 1996, pp. 8385).11
2.1.2 The United States
As is well known, there were regional di¤erences in the timing of industrialization in the United
States. The economic take-o¤ of New England occurred in the period 18151850, whereas that of
the American North in 18431870 (Rostow, 1978, p. 392). In the north-eastern region, the share
of child workers employed in manufacturing was 23.1% in 1820 (Goldin and Sokolo¤, 1982, p. 748).
It is estimated that in 1832 children amounted to about 40% of factory workers in New England
(Weiner, 1991, p. 142). The proportion of child labor would have been much higher in agriculture,
a dominant sector in the early 19th century.12 At the national level, about one-sixth of children
between the ages 10 to 15 were gainfully employed even in 1880 (Sanderson, 1974, p. 297; Weiner,
1991, p. 145). Given these gures, one can imagine that earlier years would have seen higher ratios
of children in the labor force.
These records indicate that one of the principal obstacles to universal education was how to
provide education for those working children. Hence, early educational reforms were presumably
a compromise between the need for child labor and that for child education. In the late 1830s,
industrial states passed laws which required factory children to go to school three months every
year (Church, 1976, p. 59). In 1836, Massachusetts legislated that (at least) three months of school
attendance was required, in advance, for the employment of children under the age of 15 in man-
ufacturing (Weiner, 1991, pp. 142143). Under the Massachusetts labor-attendance law in 1842,
it was the duty of the local school committees to secure the school attendance of children, while
all factory children under the age of 12 were prohibited from working more than 10 hours a day
(Ensign, 1969, p. 49).
2.1.3 Britain
Child labor played an important role even in early 19th century Britain, one of the most advanced
economies at that time. In 1816, workers under the age of 18 accounted for 51.2% of workers
11A careful investigation by Osada (1995) identies the locations of about 300 childminders schools that were
established in 36 prefectures between 1876 and 1930 (pp. 211215), and the typical student in the subsample he
analyzed were girls between the ages of 11 and 14 (pp. 325334).
12 In 1820, the proportion of workers employed in agriculture was 73% in New England, and 74% in the Middle
Atlantic (Goldin and Sokolo¤, 1982, p. 748).
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in the British cotton industry, and 60.2% in the Scottish ax industry (Nardinelli, 1990, p. 109).
The Census of England and Wales records that at least 36.6% of boys aged 1014 were working
in 1851 (Cunningham, 1996, p. 42). The earnings of children were an important income source
of the working class. In the period from 1817 to 1839, records show that the children of mining,
factory, and outworking workers earned, respectively, 23.9%, 28.2%, and 27.5% of household income
(Horrell and Humphries 1995, p. 491).
These gures indicate parentshesitation in sending their children to school at that time. For
instance, the records of the Mitcham National School show that during the years 18301939, the
average length of stay of pupils was 34.3 months, and 57% of boys left school to start work (Madoc-
Jones, 1977, pp. 45, 47). Even in 1889, the London School Board issued as many as 96,450 initial
notices to parents failing to send their children to school (Rubinstein, 1977, p. 245).13 Furthermore,
there is a view that the London poor, estimated to be 30.7% of the population in 1891, opposed
education for their children, in part because those poor needed the earnings of their children
(ibid., pp. 235236). It is conjectured from these gures that the rst half of the 19th century saw
widespread, intense opposition to compulsory education.14
In these circumstances, early factory legislation compromised between regulating child labor
and promoting child education. The Factories Act of 1833 imposed two-hour schooling on six days
a week on working children aged 9 to 11 in the main textile industries (Silver 1977, p. 141). The
Factory Act of 1844 enacted the half-time system, which restricted the work time of children to
half a day, either before or after the dinner hour (Hutchins and Harrison, 1926, pp. 76, 85). As
stated by Silver (1977, p. 141), The half-time system, foreshadowed in the early Factory Acts and
e¤ective from 1845, began as a strategy for combating excessive child labour and became, in the
1850s and 1860s, an educational theory.
2.1.4 France
As in Britains case, the progress of French educational reform was gradual. The education law in
1833 made primary education universally available (Weissbach, 1989, p. 3). Nevertheless, that was
not fully made use of by the poorer classes, who needed child labor for their daily life. In 1840,
13Hurt (1979, p. 155) introduces two court cases, from The Times in November 1875, in which the London School
Board was involved. They show that compulsory school attendance was a big burden on the poor.
14See Hopkins (1994, p. 142) for supporting episodes in the mid-19th century Black Country.
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more than a quarter of the children aged 6 to 12 in France did not attend school in part because
their labor was needed at home (ibid.).15
Evidence shows that children were working for their families out of necessity, at least before
the mid-19th century. According to a study published in 1840, it cost 960 francs a year for a four-
member family to live in Melhouse, whereas a laborer or dyer in the local cotton industry could
earn at most 450 francs a year (Heywood, 1988, p. 108). As for handloom weavers in Rouen, the
annual cost of living, 912 francs, was greater than the standard parental income, 861 francs (ibid.,
pp. 108109). In the mid-1840s, several School Inspectors found that school attendance in rural
areas declined when bread became expensive (ibid., p. 88).
Given such economic importance of children for households, it is not surprising that France
began its educational reform while accepting child employment. Evening classes were held by the
municipality in Mulhouse in the early 1830s, and in Lille in the early 1840s, although they were
not very successful (ibid., pp. 244245). The child labor law passed in 1841 provided a certain level
of education for children aged 12 or below, while regulating the minimum age of employment to
8 (Ogg and Sharp, 1929, p. 382). Faced with working class opposition, this rst child labor law
was ine¤ective, and the child labor law passed in 1874 was more e¤ectively enforced by a special
inspectorate (Nardinelli, 1990, pp. 126127, 137).
2.1.5 Germany
In Prussia, the rst school edict was issued as the General-Landschul-Geglement of 1763, with
the aim of providing compulsory education for all children aged 5 to 13 (Melton, 1988, p. 174).
However, such an early attempt was unsuccessful. The four schools in Berlin, Kloster Berg, Stettin
and Königsberg produced far too few graduates to meet the goals of the reform (ibid., p. 175
176).One of the reasons for the failure was the need for child labor for the poor. Indeed, summer
school was impossible to run because rural families, especially in summer, needed their children to
be working (ibid., p. 176).
Similarly, 40 out of about 100 petty schools in Bremen were closed between 1788 and 1810,
during which children found new work opportunities in tobacco processing (Cunningham 1995,
p. 103). This indicates that a large proportion of households in Bremen gave priority to child labor
15 In 1840, 756,464 boys were in communal primary schools in winter, whereas the number attending declined to
463,464 in summer, possibly a season when their labor was especially needed at home (ibid.).
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over child education at that time, and probably, in earlier periods as well. During the period 1800
1846, children under the age of 14 accounted for between 10 and 20% of factory workers (Lee, 1978,
p. 466). In particular, until the 1850s children were of great assistance in textile factories, where
their hands were suitable for picking up the threads (ibid.).
Under these circumstances, early educational reform encountered di¢ culties in its enforcement.
The Prussian law of 1839 obliged children under the age of 16 to attend school ve hours a day,
while limiting their work time to 10 hours (Ogg and Sharp, 1929, p. 389). However, the local
authorities (including police, teachers and clergymen) were unwilling and unable to enforce the law
and, accordingly, the schooling time was cut to three hours a day in 1853 with limited enforcement
(ibid., p. 390). One can imagine from these events that the local authorities had sympathy for poor
children who were working for their families. Similar results were observed in other German states
such as Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hesse: they failed to restrict child labor and to spread
public schooling (ibid.).
2.2 Public Education as a Right
More recently, compulsory education is widely perceived to be essential for securing the minimum
living standard in advanced countries. In fact, children in OECD countries attend on average 11.9
years of schooling (OECD, 2006, p. 41), exceeding the compulsory years in most cases.16 This fact,
along with the evidence given in Section 2.1, suggests that the notion of compulsory education for
their citizens had shifted from a duty to a right.17
Such a shift in individual attitudes toward education became widespread around the turn of the
20th century, although the timing varied across countries. In Japan, the aforementioned classroom
attendance rate at primary level rose to 89.63% in 1913 (Japan National Commission for UNESCO,
1966, p. 64). This implies that most school-age children remained at primary schools after being
enrolled. In the United States, 32.3% of children aged 14 to 17 were enrolled in secondary schools
in 1920, a sharp increase from 6.7% in 1890 (Church, 1976, p. 289). In Secondary Education for
All, published in 1922, the British Labor Party suggests the need for post-elementary education for
16See the webpage of the Japanese Ministry of Education:
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chukyo/chukyo3/gijiroku/001/04052101/009/005.htm
17This point has been emphasized by many scholars. See Shibuya (1988, p. 167) for Japans case, and Weiner
(1991) for a more comprehensive analysis.
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working-class children (Hopkins, 1994, p. 321).18
This hypothesis is supported by Nardinelli (1990), who investigates the historical evidence for
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.S. He argues that As working-class incomes rose,
parents kept children out of the labor force until later and later ages. The production of well-
educated children became a realistic and desirable alternative for the working-class family in the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The desire of parents to improve the quality of their
children would have been su¢ cient, in the absence of child labor laws, to remove children from
factories in the long run (p. 149).The minor role of child labor laws on school levels is also found
by Landes and Solmons (1972) regression analysis for the U.S. states in the late 19th century.
Also, in Prussian textile factories, the number of child workers dropped by about 30% for the
period 18461853, when child labor legislation was not e¤ective (Lee, 1978, p. 467).
While several socioeconomic forces were at work in the transformation, two forces are empha-
sized as of particular importance in this paper: the rise in the net return on education investment,
and the improvement in living standards. The rst force motivated parents to educate their children
if they could a¤ord it.19 By 1880, Félix Pécaut, apostle of progressive education in France, reported
that families began to notice the advantage of obtaining a school certicate for nding jobs, inducing
parents to permit longer school attendance by their children (Weber, 1976, pp. 73, 328). Likewise,
high school education in the United States began to be regarded as a means to secure white-collar
occupations emerging at the end of the 19th century (Church, 1976, p. 290). In Britain at that time,
secondary and university education were increasing their importance in achieving or maintaining
social status (Glass and Grebenik 1965, p. 117). On the cost side, technological progress reduced
the forgone wages of children attending school. For example, in the aforementioned German textile
factories, the signicant role of child labor was replaced by improved machines in the late 1840s
(Lee, 1978, p. 467).
The second force, improved living standards, did more than reduce child labor: it altered
parentsmyopic views on child rearing, and thereby induced them to care about the future well-
being of their children. In the United States, the aforementioned spread of secondary education
18 In 1950, the share of secondary school pupils in the 1019 age group reached 33.7% in England and Wales (Flora
et al., 1983, pp. 626).
19The underlying assumption here is that imperfect credit markets prevent households from borrowing school fees.
This credit-market imperfection appears to be plausible in under- and semi-developed stages.
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was in part because of rapid, widespread growth in per capita income after 1900, which would
have allowed more families to keep sending their children to school without relying on their forgone
wages (Church, 1976, pp. 289290). Similarly in France, fewer children were in the labor force in
the second half of the 19th century, during which real wages kept rising (Heywood, 1988, p. 109;
Nardinelli, 1990, p. 146). In Britain, the average real wage over the period 19001909 increased to
almost twice the level of the period 18501859 (Polland, 1978, p. 171). The improved living standard
was also conrmed by looking at the number of prosecutions. By 1910, it dropped to 36,823 from
the peak level of 92,274 in 1883 and, furthermore, truancy was the second most common case
in roughly the same period (Hurt, 1979, p. 203).20 Finally, in Japan, real GDP per capita more
than doubled between 18901990 (Maddison, 2001, p. 206). Taira (1971, p. 374) points out that
accelerated Japanese growth in this period lightened the burden on households while the rate of
classroom attendance increased by about 20%.
3 The Model
Consider a closed overlapping-generations economy operating over an innite discrete-time horizon.
In perfectly competitive environments, producers generate a single homogeneous nal good by
employing individuals of all generations. Growth in output per worker is driven by education
investment and population growth.
In every period, the government levies an income tax on working adults in order to provide
education for children and an old-age related service. The allocation of tax revenues between the
two services is determined by the adult and old generations, whose political power varies with the
age composition of the population. Compulsory schooling works as a child labor regulation: this
a¤ects householdschild-rearing strategies.
3.1 Producers
The nal good is produced in two independent sectors, A and B. In sector A, competitive rms
employ adult workers as a single factor of production. Letting Y At be the aggregate level of output
20Although not mentioned, this is probably the record for England and Wales because these two countries are
focused on throughout the book.
12
produced by this sector in period t ( 0), the production function is written as
Y At = AtHt;
where At > 0 is the level of technology in period t and Ht is the aggregate amount of e¢ ciency labor
employed in period t. For simplicity, the price of the nal good is normalized to unity. Standard
prot maximization reveals that the wage rate per e¢ ciency labor in period t, denoted as wt; equals
the marginal labor productivity, At.
On the other hand, sector B employs children and old individuals by using a less advanced
technology. Letting Y Bt be the aggregate level of sector Bs output in period t, the production
function is
Y Bt = wLt;
where w > 0 is the stationary level of technology and Lt is the aggregate amount of raw labor
employed in period t: As a result of prot maximization, w equals the competitive wage rate per
raw labor in sector B:
3.2 Households
A new generation, consisting of a continuum of individuals, is born at the beginning of every
period and lives for three periods. This means that there are three generations in society at each
point in time. All individuals have perfect foresight and behave as price takers. Adult individuals
make three choices in child rearing: how many children to bear, how much education to give these
children, and how much their children will work.21 The political system is controlled by three
interest groups: the adult rich, the adult poor, and the old. While adult individuals di¤er in their
skill levels, old individuals are homogeneous in this respect.
3.2.1 The Environment
Consider the life stream of an individual who is born in period t   1 to be a member of group i
(= R;P ): The individual has one unit of time in each of the three life periods. In the rst period
(childhood), the individual works and/or receives education, while consuming a time fraction of
21The omission of capital markets would not a¤ect householdschild rearing strategies. Considering the limited
access to capital markets in the early years of the Industrial Revolution, presumably most households at that time
were unable to borrow education costs.
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her/his single parent. The work time of the child depends on the levels of private and public
education. There is no decision made by the child.
In the second period (adulthood or parenthood), the individual is obliged to serve  units of
time for the government, where  2 (0; 1) is exogenously given and stationary over time. Thus
the time left to the individual is 1    T; which is allocated between working and child rearing.
The individual works in sector A by supplying e¢ ciency labor, which is the product of her/his
work time and skill level hit. Meanwhile, the individual raises n
i
t units of children by spending a
xed time fraction  > 0 per child, and possibly further invests eit units of time per child for skill
acquisition. Each of the children supplies lit units of labor in sector B to earn wl
i
t for her/his parent.
These wage incomes are spent for their consumption in this period, cit. It follows that the budget
constraint of the parent is
cit  zit[T   ( + eit   !it)nit]; (1)
where zit  wthit denotes parental potential income, and !it  wlit=zit is the child labor income
in terms of the parents work time. It is assumed that !it is not high enough to fully cover the
noneducation cost of child rearing; i.e., !it <  8t:22 Human capital hit depreciates completely by
the end of adulthood.
In the third period (elderhood), the individual becomes unskilled, and earns w by inelastically
supplying one unit of labor in Sector B. The obtained income is spent for her/his own consumption
c3t+1, and there is no intergenerational transfers. The individual is exempted from taxation and
receives an old-aged related public service for free of charge. It follows that the budget constraint
of the old individual is c3t+1  w:
Preferences in adulthood are dened over the level of consumption and the quantity of her/his
children. Preferences in elderhood are dened over three economic factors: her/his consumption,
the received amount of public service, and the average quality of her/his children. The lifetime
utility function of an adult individual i (an adult member of group i) in period t is given by
uit = (1  ) ln cit +  lnnit + it[(1  ) lnmin(c3t+1; xt+1) +  lnhit+1]; (2)
where  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1);  > 0; and it denotes the income-dependent discount rate taking a
22This assumption negates child labor income as an incentive for childbirth, and excludes the feasibility of an
innite number of children to be born. See Footnote 25.
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discrete form
it = (z
i
t) 
8<: 0 for zit < z; > 0 for zit  z: (3)
A plausible interpretation of (3) is that low-income adults live from hand to mouth, and do not
care about the future.23 Following Galor and Weil (2000), it is assumed for simplicity that the
weight on the quantity of children equals the weight on the quality of children; i.e.,  = :
3.2.2 The Production of Child Labor and Human Capital
Let eGt denote the time the government spends for the education of each child in period t. Then,
the labor supply of a child i (a child of group i) in period t, denoted as lit; is given by a continuous
function
lit = l(e
i
t + e
G
t )
8<: > 0 if eit + eGt < e^;= 0 if eit + eGt  e^; (4)
where e^ > 0:24 Namely, the work time is left to the child if and only if less than e^ units of
time is invested in her/his education. Furthermore, the function satises l(0) = 1; l0(e) < 0 and
l00(e)  0 8e 2 [0; e^): Thus child labor supply is inversely related to the level of education, and no
education investment allows the child one unit of labor supply. In this sense, compulsory schooling
plays the role of a child labor regulation.
It follows that the labor income of a child i in period t is, in terms of her/his parents work
time,
!it =
wl(eit + e
G
t )
zit
 !(eit; eGt ; zit): (5)
In light of (1), this shows that the forgone wages of children are the only costs of public education
incurred by households. Thus, in terms of cost, public education is superior to private education.
The skill level of an adult individual i in period t+ 1 is determined by the production function
hit+1 = a
ih(eit; e
G
t ); (6)
where ai (aR > aP = 1) denotes the stationary learning ability of group i. This formulation means
that only teaching time enhances the human capital children will acquire. The function h() is
23 If instead it =  > 0 8zit  0, parents might invest in private education while having their children work. As will
become apparent, (3) is useful to exclude this possibility and simplies the dynamic analysis without changing the
central argument of the paper.
24eit+ e
G
t is the total time spent for the education of a child i in period t; rather than the time the child spends for
education. For this reason, the critical level e^ does not have to be the total time the child has (i.e. one unit of time).
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continuous and is dened on R2+; featuring three properties. First, a noneducated adult of dynasty
P obtains one unit of human capital; that is, h(0; 0) = 1: Second, the function is increasing and
strictly concave with respect to each argument. Third, and as mentioned in the introduction,
private and public education are substitutes. These properties are expressed as hj() > 0; hjj() <
0 and h12() < 0 for (eit; eGt )  0 and j = 1; 2.
3.2.3 Optimization
By taking market prices and government policies as given, an adult individual i in period t makes
a decision of childbirth and private education so as to maximize her/his utility (2). Since this
decision has no e¤ect on the wage income w and thus consumption when old, the optimal choice is
fnit; eitg = argmax(1  ) ln[T   ( + eit   !(eit; eGt ; zit))nit] +  lnnit + (zit) lnh(eit; eGt ); (7)
subject to the budget constraint (1) and (nit; e
i
t)  0; zit > w=.25
The objective function is strictly concave with respect to nit. The rst-order condition for n
i
t
reveals that the net cost of child rearing is
( + eit   !it)nit = T; (8)
implying that nit > 0: The relationship between n
i
t and e
i
t in (8) indicates that the individual faces
a trade-o¤ between the quantity and the quality of children. Equally important, an increase in the
relative wage of child labor, !it; induces her/him to have more children.
Optimization with respect to eit is straightforward for individuals who cannot a¤ord to care
about the future: in light of (3), (zit) = 0 and thus e
i
t = 0 if z
i
t < z
: If zit  z and thus (zit) = ;
on the other hand, optimization is more complicated because, as shown below, multiple local optima
may exist in this case.
The situation in the second case above is shown by Figure 2. On the lower panel is the (partially
indirect) utility function obtained from substituting (8) into (7).26 The solid curve there indicates
the utility levels based on a given pair eGt  0 and zmin  z: Note that the curve is kinked at
eit = e^   eGt ; where no work time is left to a child i in period t: In fact, there may be two locally
25The restriction on zit is necessary to assure the existence of the optimal pair (n
i
t; e
i
t): If this condition is violated,
nit can be innitely large by choosing e
i
t = 0; for example.
26The slope of the indirect utility function is depends on the signs of the functions Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) and D
h(eit; e
G
t ) in
the upper panel. See Appendix 1 for details.
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optimal levels of private education, respectively, below and above the kink point: the lower level
allows children to work, whereas the higher level does not.27
In what follows, it is assumed that the marginal productivity of private education, h1(eit; e
G
t );
is large enough to satisfy
h1(e^; e^)( + e^) > h(e^; e^): (A1)
Lemma 1 If (A1) is satised and zit  z; a locally optimal level of private education is given by
a continuous single-valued function (eGt ) such that (e
G
t ) + e
G
t > e^ and 
0(eGt )  0 8eGt  0; with
strict inequality if (eGt ) > 0:
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
According to the rst property of () above, choosing the level (eGt ) for private education
leaves no time for children to work. The second property means that parents not using child labor
aim to substitute private education for reduced public education.
The global optimality of the level (eGt ) depends on the relative productivity of child workers
to their parents. A rise in parental potential income makes child labor less productive, and thereby
reduces the opportunity cost of schooling. This transition is illustrated by Figure 2. As zi increases
to zhigh and further, the utility curve in the lower panel shifts downward only on the interval [0; e^),
where child labor is used, and ultimately the level (eGt ) becomes globally optimal. This result is
formally given by Lemma 2 below.
Lemma 2 If (A1) is satised and zit  z; there exists a level of potential income, z^; above
which (eGt ) is the globally optimal level of private education for any e
G
t  0:
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Lemmas 12 are summarized as follows: Parents do not rely on child labor and invest in private
education, provided that their potential incomes are greater than z^ as well as than z. In order to
simplify the dynamic analysis below, it is assumed that parents do not use child labor if they are
wealthy enough to care about the future skills of their children (i.e. it = ). That is to say,
z^ < z: (A2)
27There is the possibility of a corner solution. For example, suppose that eit = e
G
t = 0: Substituting (8) into (7) yields
 ln+ (1  ) ln(1  ) + lnT    ln(   w=zit): In this case, utility goes to innity as w=zit approaches . On the
other hand, if eit > e
G
t = 0; then (8) shows that n
i
t and thus utility remain nite when w=z
i
t approaches . Hence a
corner solution eit = 0 may exist depending on the values of z
i
t and e
G
t :
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This condition assures that no parents choose a level of private education on the range (0; e^), where
children have time to work. In other words, it excludes the case where parents privately educate
their children while sending them to work.
It follows that the optimal decision on private education is summarized as
eit = e(e
G
t ; z
i
t) 
8<: 0 if w= < zit < z;(eGt )  0 if zit  z; (9)
where (eGt ) + e
G
t > e^ and 
0(eGt )  0 8eGt  0; with equality only if (eGt ) = 0: Substituting (9)
into (8) and noting (5) yield that
nit = n(e
G
t ; z
i
t) 
8<:
T
 !(0;eGt ;zit)
> 1 if w= < zit < z
;
T
+(eGt )
> 0 if zit  z;
(10)
where T   by assumption.28 Note that the choice of childbirth hinges on education policy as
well as the level of parental potential income, and their e¤ects change qualitatively depending on
the three cases below.
First, if eGt < e^ and w= < z
i
t < z
; an adult individual i in period t has her/his children work
instead of educating them privately. Hence, an increase in eGt works as a child labor regulation,
and an increase in the parents potential income zit reduces the relative wage of children !
i
t. Both
of them discourage childbirth, meaning that n1(eGt ; z
i
t) < 0 and n2(e
G
t ; z
i
t) < 0:
Second, if eGt > e^ and w= < z
i
t < z
; the parent does not invest in private education, while the
government regulates child labor completely. Under these environments, an increase in either eGt
or zit has no e¤ect on the relative wage of children, no e¤ect on the decision of private education,
and thus no e¤ect on the incentive of childbirth. That is, n1(eGt ; z
i
t) = n2(e
G
t ; z
i
t) = 0:
Third and nally, if zit  z; the parent invests in private education with no use of child labor,
regardless of education policy. An increase in eGt induces the parent to reduce e
i
t and to increase n
i
t,
because of the substitutability between public and private education, and through the quantity
quality trade-o¤ in child rearing. Furthermore, as in the second case, no child labor income implies
that nit is independent of z
i
t. It is now clear that n1(e
G
t ; z
i
t)  0 and n2(eGt ; zit) = 0 in this case.
28This assumption requires the weight parameter on childbirth, ; to be su¢ ciently larger than the noneducation
cost per child, : Without this condition, even a family relying on child labor may not have more than one child a
case not supported by historical evidence.
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3.3 The Government
In period t, the government imposes a tax, in the form of time, on Nt units of adult workers. Each
of them is obliged to serve  2 (0; 1) units of time for public services. Thus the government obtains
Nt units of time in period t, allocating them between education for children and the old-age related
service. These two public services are free of charge for all beneciaries. All adult individuals have
the same ability in the production of the public services.
Let nt  Nt+1=Nt denote the average number of children per adult in period t: Each public
school class consists of nt units of students and one teacher; that is to say, each adult individual
equally teaches nt units of children at the same time.29 Thus  is the maximum spending on public
education per child, and the budget constraint facing the government is eGt 2 [0;  ]:
Let xt be the level of public service each old individual receives in period t. For simplicity, xt
is assumed to be the time allocated for this service; that is
xt =
(   eGt )Nt
Nt 1
= (   eGt )nt 1  x(eGt ; nt 1); (11)
where nt 1  Nt=Nt 1 denotes the child/adult ratio in period t 1 (or the adult/old ratio in period
t). The e¤ects on xt of education policy and of fertility is straightforward: A rise in eGt shifts the
government spending from the elderly to the young, leading to a reduction in xt. A rise in nt 1
increases the number of taxpayers per old individual, and thereby increases xt:
3.4 The Political System
In every period, adult individuals, together with the old, decide the budget allocated to young
generations. The decision on childbirth is made in advance by perfectly forecasting the political
decision.30 As will become apparent, the three interest groups, the adult rich, the adult poor, and
the old, have di¤erent political powers.
First, consider the level of public education desirable for an adult individual i in period t;
denoted as eGit . As implied by (11), education policy in this period has no direct e¤ect on the
old-age related service xt+1: It thus follows from (2) that
eGit = argmax
0eGt 
(1  ) ln[T   ( + eit   !(eit; eGt ; zit))nit] + (zit) lnh(eit; eGt ); (12)
29More generally, one may assume that "nt units of children are enrolled in each class, where " > 0 is a constant.
30As will be disccussed in Footnote 32, the timing of childbirth changes the reason for poor families to oppose
educational reform.
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subject to eit  0; nit > 0 and zit > w=.
Next, consider the level of public education desirable for the elderly in period t; eG3t . Substituting
the budget constraint c3t = w and (11) into (2), one nds that
eG3t = argmax
0eGt 
min[ w; x(eGt ; nt 1)];
where x(eGt ; nt 1) = (   eGt )nt 1: Note that there exists a unique value ~et such that  w =
x(~et; nt 1); and the qualitative e¤ect of education policy changes at this critical level. Increas-
ing eGt up to ~et has no e¤ect on the elderly, whereas the e¤ect becomes negative on the range above
~et:
The elderly, when indi¤erent, are assumed to accept the policy proposed by younger generations.
Then the desirable level of public education for old individuals in period t; denoted as eG3t ; is
eG3t =
8<: eG2t if eG2t  ~et;max(~et; 0) if eG2t > ~et; (13)
where
~et =     w
nt 1
 ~e(nt 1): (14)
Note that ~e(nt 1) <  and ~e0(nt 1) > 0 8nt 1 > 0: The rst property means that the maximum
spending on public education,  ; is large enough to provoke opposition by the elderly. This is
straightforward because such an extreme policy leaves no budget for the old-age related service xt:
The second property implies that the elderly can accept higher levels of public education as the
relative number of taxpayers increases.
It is now ready to discuss how education policy is determined in the presence of potential
conict. Based on the evidence in Section 2, the political system considered here incorporates two
ideas. First, all interest groups have some political inuence regardless of their voting status.31
Second, the political power of adult individuals in period t increases with the adult/old population
ratio in period t; nt 1. More specically, the equilibrium level of public education is a weighted
average such that
eGt = (nt 1)[e
GR
t + (1  )eGPt ] + [1  (nt 1)]eG3t ; (15)
where  2 (0; 1) and (0) = 0; limn!1 (n) = 1 and 0(nt 1) > 0 8nt 1  0:
31Flora et al. (1983) show that su¤rage was limited in Western Europe in the rst half of the 19th century.
Nevertheless, as evidenced in Section 2.1, administrators at that time encountered practical di¢ culties in enforcing
school attendance.
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3.5 Population Growth and Technological Change
Let N it+1 denote the number of adult members i in period t + 1: Then, noting that there is no
within-group heterogeneity, one nds that
N it+1 =
Z N it
s=0
nitds = n
i
tN
i
t :
The average fertility rate in period t, nt, is dened as
nt  Nt+1
Nt
=
NRt+1 +N
P
t+1
Nt
= qtn
R
t + (1  qt)nPt ; (16)
where qt  NRt =Nt is the share of group R in the adult generation in period t: Note that nt is the
child/adult ratio in period t, and also the adult/old ratio in period t+ 1:
Then it follows from (8) that the aggregate level of e¢ ciency labor employed by Sector A in
period t+ 1 is
Ht+1 =
X
i=R;P

[T   ( + eit+1   !it+1)nit+1]hit+1N it+1
	
= (1  )TNt[qtnRt hRt+1 + (1  qt)nPt hPt+1]: (17)
Suppose that Ht+1 is the single determinant of technological progress between periods t and t+ 1:
That is
gt+1  At+1  At
At
= g(Ht+1); (18)
where g() is a single-valued continuous function such that g(0) = 0 and g0(H) > 0 8H  0:
This formulation implies that there is no depreciation in the level of technology (or knowledge)
and At is nondecreasing over time. Equally important, it incorporates the well-known idea that
larger populations tend to create more ideas (cf. Kuznets [1960]; Kremer [1993]; Galor and Weil
[2000]). In the presence of such a scale e¤ect, education investment is not necessary for economic
growth: as long as a population exists, the productivity of adult workers improves over time. By
contrast, there is no scale e¤ect and no technological progress in sector B. This type of age-biased
technological progress decreases the relative productivity of child labor over time.
4 The Evolution of the Economy
This section demonstrates that the dynamic model presented above generates the development
process consistent with the historical experience in Section 2. The economy goes through three
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stages of development through which individuals views toward public education change. The
resulting progress in educational reform is followed by a steady decline in the birthrate.
Stage I is the premature development stage without skill investment. Because of low living
standards, adult workers are not inclined to educate their children at the sacrice of child labor
income. As a result, neither private nor public investment in education occurs, and population
expansion is the single driving force of technological progress. It is shown that a small degree of
the scale e¤ect leads to the acceleration of population growth.
Stage II is marked by the emergence of public education. Skill-biased technological progress
gradually raises the relative productivity of skilled workers and makes them wealthy enough to care
about the future performance of their children. These environmental changes induce them to aban-
don child labor, triggering the educational reform movement. However, they encounter opposition
from the less skilled poor, who still need child labor income for consumption. These conicting
policy stances limit the provision of public education and, accordingly, its growth-enhancing ef-
fects. On other hand, the legislation of compulsory schooling discourages childbirth for the poor
by regulating the work time of their children.
Stage III encompasses population aging and generational conict over public policies. In this
developed stage, all adult individuals are wealthy enough to care about the future skills of their chil-
dren, and the relative productivities of child workers are su¢ ciently low. Now even the less skilled
adults come to regard the receipt of public education as a right and there is no political conict
within the adult generation. Accordingly, educational reform makes further progress. Moreover,
the onset of universal investment in education, both by households and the government, decelerates
population growth.
The rise of education policy, however, is followed by a drop in later stages. As society ages,
old generations demanding other public services become more politically inuential. The rising
pressures of the old cause a policy bias in their favor, and thereby lay a nancial burden on young
households. To make up for the undersupply of public education (as a right), they spend more on
private education by having fewer children. This chain reaction generates a vicious cycle between
social aging and the deterioration of public education, and this spiral may cause population decline
and a slowdown in economic growth in the long run.
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4.1 Stage I: Economic Growth Driven by Population Expansion
Stage I is the initial development stage that occurs before period t; when zRt exceeds z for the rst
time (namely, zRt < z
 8t < t and zRt  z for t = t): In this stage, no parents are wealthy enough
to care about the future of their children. Consequently, neither private nor public education
investment occurs, and technological progress is driven solely by population expansion.
4.1.1 Education, Child Labor, and Fertility
Sector A in period 0 consists of adult workers who have only innate skills. Since their potential
incomes are zR0 = a
RA0 and zP0 = A0; there is between-group inequality. As shown by (6) and (9),
a rise in zit has a nonnegative e¤ect on private investment in child education, e
i
t; and then on the
acquired skill level, hit+1 = a
ih(eit; e
G
t ): Therefore, the persistent ability gap between adult workers
results in
zRt > z
P
t 8t  0: (19)
Thus it follows from (3) that zPt < z
R
t < z
 and Rt = Pt = 0 8t 2 [0; t): Hence in Stage I, adult
individuals do not gain utility from the future skills of their children. In this situation, as shown by
(9), no one invests in private education regardless of education policy; i.e., eit = e(e
G
t ; z
i
t) = 0 8eGt 
0:
Using these results for (12), the desirable education policy for the parental generation in Stage
I is
eGit = argmax
0eGt 
f1  [   !(0; eGt ; zit)]nitg = 0:
In other words, parents do not desire compulsory education as sending their children to school
takes away the opportunity for them to work. Educational reform would merely diminish their
child labor income !it; consumption c
i
t; and thus utility u
i
t, because their choice on childbirth is
made in advance. These predicted adverse e¤ects prompt the adult generation to oppose the
introduction of public education.32 Then it follows from (13) and (15) that there is no generational
conict and eGt = 0 8t 2 [0; t):
32The reason for their opposition changes depending on the timing of childbirth. If parents have children after the
education policy was determined, nPt is adjusted so that (8) holds. Then it follows that consumption is c
P
t = (1 )TzPt
regardless of education policy. In this case, it is the negative e¤ect on childbirth, rather than on consumption, that
induces the opposition of group P against educational reform.
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As a result of no schooling, all children spend their entire time on working in sector B: They
grow up to have only innate skills, hit = a
ih(0; 0) = ai, and potential incomes zit = a
iAt: Thus in
Stage I, technological progress is the single force pushing up the level of zit, and At grows toward
z=aR.
Then it follows from (5) and (10) that householdsbirthrates in Stage I are
nPt =
T
   w=At > n
R
t =
T
   w=(aRAt) > 1; (20)
where w= < At < z=aR: Note that parents of group P are more fertile than those of group R; as
child labor is more valuable for the formers than the latters. Equally important, nit decreases with
At because technological progress in Sector A reduces the relative productivity of children, working
in Sector B:
4.1.2 The Dynamical System
As shown above, nRt and n
P
t depend only on At whereas h
R
t+1 and h
P
t+1 are constant for t 2 [0; t).
Thus the resulting level of e¢ ciency labor, Ht+1 in (17), depends on At, Nt and qt:
Using these results for (16) and (18), the evolution of the economy in Stage I, where At < z=aR;
is governed by the rst-order, three-dimensional autonomous system:
At+1 = [1 + g(Ht+1)]At  GI(At; Nt; qt)At;
Nt+1 = ntNt  nI(At; qt)Nt; (21)
qt+1 =
nRt
nt
qt  mI(At; qt)qt;
where the initial set (A0; N0; q0) satises33
w

< A0 <
z
aR
; N0 > 0; 0 < q0 < q
max: (A3)
The three state variables of the dynamical system evolve in the following ways. First, the
growth rate of technology gt+1 has a positive lower bound, and thus the level of technology At
grows without converging to a certain level.34 Second, nt > 1 and thus the total population Nt
keeps expanding. Third, nRt < nt and thus the share of group R in the adult generation, qt; strictly
monotonically declines over time.
33The upper limit qmax 2 (0; 1] is dened by the proof of Equation (31) in Appendix 1.
34As follows from (17) and (20), Ht+1 in (21) has a positive lower bound such that Ht+1 > (1   )TNt+1 >
(1  )TN0.
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Accordingly, the parental potential income zRt = a
RAt grows strictly monotonically over time,
ultimately exceeding the critical level z. This means that there is no steady state in Stage I and
the economy inevitably departs from there. As for the average fertility rate, nt may or may not
decrease over time because of two opposing forces at work: On the one hand, technological progress
discourages childbirth by making child labor less productive compared to adult labor. On the other
hand, the more fertile group, the adult poor, increases its share over time (note that nI(At; qt)
is decreasing in qt): The lemma below suggests that the average fertility rate increases when slow
technological progress makes the former negative force negligible.
Lemma 3 Under (A1)(A3), nt > nt 1 for t 2 (0; t) if At is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
The possibility of population growth acceleration in this initial stage of industrialization appears
to be historically plausible. According to Maddison (2001, p. 242), the average growth rate of
population reached a peak during the period 18201870 in the U.S., 18701913 in Germany and
the U.K., and 19131950 in Japan.
4.2 Stage II: Educational Reform with Class Conict
The economy develops in Stage II on the time interval [t; t0); where t0 is the critical period in which
zPt exceeds z
 for the rst time (i.e., zPt < z 8t < t0 and zPt  z for t = t0). In this stage, members
of group R are wealthy enough to care about the future skills of their children, whereas this is
not the case for group P . Furthermore, the relative productivity of child workers is low enough
for group R to abandon child labor. In these circumstances, educational reform is promoted by
the rich class, who face the opposition of the poor. Compulsory schooling works as a child labor
regulation that discourages childbirth in group P:
4.2.1 Education and Child Labor
In the initial period of Stage II, zRt = a
RAt  z: Since the level of technology At is, according to
(18), nondecreasing over time, it follows that
zRt = Ath
R
t  z; Rt = ; 8t  t: (22)
As for group P; on the other hand, zPt < z
 and thus Pt = 0 in Stage II.
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Under these circumstances, (9) reveals that individualsdecisions of private education are eRt =
(eGt ) and e
P
t = 0 8eGt  0: In fact, since (eGt ) + eGt > e^ 8eGt  0; (4) shows that lRt = 0 8eGt  0.
In other words, whether the government regulates child labor or not, adult members of group R do
not send their children to work. By contrast, those of group P are still myopic and rely on child
labor income, which depends on the level of compulsory education eGt :
Using these results for (12), the desirable policy for adult individuals in Stage II are
eGRt = argmax
0eGt 
h(eRt ; e
G
t ) =  ;
eGPt = argmax
0eGt 
f1  [   !(0; eGt ; zPt )]nPt g = 0:
These results indicate the existence of between-group conict (class conict) over education policy:
Unlike group P; keeping children at school is no longer a burden for group R. The shift in their
policy preferences is caused by zRt exceeding z
 and z^: Given such a high potential income, parents
of group R take into account the future skills of their children (i.e. Rt = ). The parents also nd
that sending their children to work, rather than to school, does not compensate for the future loss.
The two adult groups facing such class conict make a compromise at  , according to (15).
In light of the historical evidence, suppose that the compromise level  does not lead to a drastic
reform. In particular,  is not large enough to completely regulate child labor, and not enough to
provoke the opposition by the elderly. That is to say,35
 < min(e^; ~et) 8t  0: (A4)
It thus follows from (15) that the resulting education policy is
eGt =  < e^ 8t 2 [t; t0); (23)
This outcome is interpreted as the half-time system mentioned in Section 2.1, in that children of
group P engage in both work and compulsory education.
4.2.2 Fertility
Substituting the results obtained above into (10), householdsbirthrates in Stage II are
nRt =
T
 + ()
R 1; nPt =
T
   !(0;  ; zPt )
> 1; (24)
35 In light of (10) and (14),  < ~et 8t  0 if  <     w=nmin; where nmin  T=[ + (0)] is a lower bound such
that nmin  nit 8t  0:
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where zPt = Ath(0; ): This shows that n
R
t remains constant over Stage II, whereas the higher rate
nPt depends on the level of technology, At:
Note that introducing compulsory education promotes group Rs childbearing by supporting
their child education; i.e., n( ; zRt ) > n(0; z
R
t ): In this sense, public education works as a childcare
service, rather than as a child labor regulation, for the rich class. By contrast, it discourages group
Ps childbearing by decreasing their child labor income; i.e., n( ; zPt ) < n(0; z
P
t ): In light of (16);
their overall e¤ect on average fertility depends on the relative share between the two groups. If
qt is su¢ ciently small, the former positive e¤ect on group R is negligible and
qtn( ; z
R
t ) + (1  qt)n( ; zPt ) < qtn(0; zRt ) + (1  qt)n(0; zPt ):
Now one obtains the proposition below.
Proposition 1 If (A1) is satised and qt is su¢ ciently small, the provision of compulsory educa-
tion in period t 2 [t; t0) decreases the average fertility rate in the same period.
Thus, compulsory education is likely to delay population growth in the developing stage where
child labor is needed by the masses. The initial value q0 is important for this result to hold because,
as will become apparent, qt strictly monotonically declines over Stages III.
4.2.3 The Dynamical System
As shown above, nPt depends only on At whereas n
R
t ; h
R
t+1 and h
P
t+1 are all constant for t 2 [t; t0).
Thus it follows from (17) that the resulting level of e¢ ciency labor Ht+1 depends on At, Nt and qt:
Using these results for (16) and (18), the evolution of the economy in Stage II, where z=aR <
At < z
=h(0; ); is governed by the rst-order, three-dimensional autonomous system:
At+1 = [1 + g(Ht+1)]At  GII(At; Nt; qt)At;
Nt+1 = ntNt  nII(At; qt)Nt; (25)
qt+1 =
nRt
nt
qt  mII(At; qt)qt;
where the initial condition (At ; Nt ; qt) 0 is determined by (21).
The dynamical system above characterizes the evolution of the three state variables as follows.
First, as in Stage I, the growth rate of technology gt+1 has a positive lower bound, and thus At
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grows without converging to a certain level.36 Second, unlike in Stage I, the total population Nt
may not grow monotonically because, in light of (24), nt R 1. As long as the share of group R is
su¢ ciently small, however, nt is greater than unity and thus the total population keeps growing.
Third, nRt < nt and thus qt+1 < qt; namely, the share of group R in the parental generation declines
over time.
Under these circumstances, both zRt and z
P
t strictly monotonically grow over time and z
P
t ulti-
mately reaches the critical level z (zPt0 = At0h(0; )  z). This assures the economys departure
from Stage II. Furthermore, as in Stage I, the time trend of average fertility is generally ambigu-
ous because of two opposing e¤ects. While the birthrate of group P declines over time, group R;
which is less fertile, reduces its share. As asserted below, the former downward pressure becomes
dominant and decelerates population growth when the share of group R is su¢ ciently small.
Lemma 4 Under (A3), nt+1 < nt for t 2 [t; t0) if qt is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
4.3 Stage III: Social Aging and the Rise of Generational Conict
Stage III, which begins in period t0; is symbolized by the rise and fall of education policy. In
this stage, all adult individuals are wealthy enough to care about the future performance of their
children. In addition, the relative wages of child workers are su¢ ciently low for even less skilled
parents to abandon child labor. As a result, adult generations unanimously support extensive
education policy. Meanwhile, population aging gradually enhances the political power of the elderly,
who demand the old-age related public service. The resulting undersupply of public education lays
an education burden on young families, and thereby discourages childbirth. These results well t
the postwar evidence of social aging paralleled by generational inequality in public services.
4.3.1 Private Education, Child Labor, and Education Policy
Consider a period in which zPt  z: Noting (19), this implies that zRt > z. In this circumstance,
(3) and (9) show that Rt = 
P
t =  and e
R
t = e
P
t = (e
G
t ) 8eGt  0: Since (eGt ) + eGt > e^ 8eGt  0;
any parents no longer send their children to work regardless of the degree of child labor regulation
36As follows from (17) and (24), Ht+1 in (25) has a positive lower bound such that Ht+1 > (1   )TNPt+1 >
(1  )TNPt .
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(i.e., lRt = l
P
t = 0 for any e
G
t  0). In this sense public schooling does not play a role of child labor
regulation.
Therefore, it follows from (12) that the policy stance of an adult individual i in this period is
eGit = argmax
0eGt 
h(eit; e
G
t ) =  :
This shows that public education is benecial and viewed as a right for all adult individuals, and
no political conict arises among them. The shift in the policy preferences of group P is caused by
the improvement in parental potential income. First, zPt exceeding z
 allows parents of the group
to care about the future performance of their children. Second, zPt exceeding z^ reduces the relative
labor productivity of their children.
The adult generations positive attitude to public education triggers generational conict, be-
cause  exceeds the upper limit for the elderly, ~et in (14). In this case, as follows from (13) and
(A4), the policy stance of the elderly is eG3t = ~et > : These results and (15) reveal that the
resulting education policy is
eGt = t + (1  t)~et > : (26)
It follows that the parental potential income of group P in the subsequent period is
zPt+1 = At+1h((e
G
t ); e
G
t ) > At0h(0; ) = z
P
t0  z;
where At+1  At  At0 : Therefore, zPt+1 > z if zPt  z: Because of the persistent inequality shown
by (19), it is now clear that
zRt > z
P
t  z; Rt = Pt = ; 8t  t0: (27)
Thus the results obtained above hold for any t  t0: In particular, note that the level of public
education in Stage III is always higher than in Stages III, where eGt   :
4.3.2 The Evolution of Fertility and Education Policy
As follows from (10), (16) and (27), the average fertility rate in Stage III is
nRt = n
P
t = nt =
T
 + (eGt )
; (28)
where (eGt ) is decreasing in e
G
t . The birthrate of group P in Stage III is lower than in the previous
stages, as the group no longer relies on child labor.
29
Now consider how eGt is determined in period t; in which e
GR
t = e
GP
t =  and the adult/old
ratio nt 1 > 0 is exogenously given. Since (13) reveals that eG3t = max[0; ~e(nt 1)] in this case, the
education policy based on the political system (15) is given by a single-valued function such that
eG(nt 1) = (nt 1) + [1  (nt 1)]max[0; ~e(nt 1)]; (29)
where 0 < eG(nt 1) <  and eG(nt 1) is strictly monotonically increasing in nt 1 > 0: Note
that a decline in nt 1 enhances the relative political power of the old generation in period t, and
accordingly reduces eGt :
Substituting (29) into (28) reveals that the evolution of the average fertility in Stage III is
governed by a rst-order, autonomous system
nt =
T
 + (eG(nt 1))
 nIII(nt 1); (30)
where nIII(nt 1) is monotonically increasing in nt 1 > 0 and the initial value nt0 1 is given by
(25).37
In addition to the positive correlation between nt and nt 1; the dynamical system (30) features
two important properties. First, as shown by Appendix 1,
nt0 = n
III(nt0 1) < nt0 1: (31)
This fertility decline reects the switch of group P from the reliance on child labor to the education
of children. Second, because 0 < eG(nt 1) <  8nt 1 > 0; the function nIII(nt 1) is bounded in
such a way that
T
 + (0)
< nIII(nt 1) <
T
 + ()
8nt 1 > 0: (32)
These properties are depicted by Figure 3. The initial value of Stage III, nt0 = nIII(nt0 1);
is below the 45 degree line. Equally important, the function is monotonically increasing and has
a positive lower bound. These ensure the existence of a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium nt =
nIII(nt) > 0; towards which nt monotonically declines over Stage III.38 Since the corresponding
path of eGt is characterized by (26) and (29), one obtains the following proposition.
37As shown by Lemma 1, 0(eGt )  0 8eGt  0; with strict inequality if(eGt ) > 0: Therefore, nIII(nt 1) is strictly
monotonically increasing in nt 1 > 0 if () > 0:
38The properties of nIII(nt 1) shown above do not ensure the uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium. In the
case of multiple equilibria, nt converges to the largest steady-state level on the interval (0; nt0 1):
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Proposition 2 (Population Aging and Political Bias) Under (A1)(A4);
(a) nt  nt 1 and  < eGt+1  eGt 8t  t0;
(b) nt converges to a nontrivial steady-state equilibrium where nt = nIII(nt) > 0 and eGt+1 = e
G
t :
Proposition 2 asserts a vicious cycle between population aging and a deterioration in education
policy. As the old/adult ratio increases, the old generation becomes more politically inuential in
the allocation of public resources. The resulting budget cut in public education raises education
costs on young families, and thereby discourages childbirth. The level of public education in Stage
III is nevertheless higher than in Stages III, where eGt   :
There are a few remarks on this result. First, as mentioned in Footnote 3, the proposition does
not mean a nominal decline in aggregate spending on public education. eGt should be viewed as
the real education expenditure in terms of the time of adult workers. Second, private education is
stimulated by a reduction in eGt because, in this stage, child education is benecial for the adult
generation. Such a substitutional relationship between private and public education does not exist
in underdeveloped stages, where households rely on child labor. Third and nally, the steady-state
fertility rate, nt = nIII(nt); may be smaller than unity, depending on the structural parameters of
the economy.39
The sequence fnt 1g1t=t0 determines the population dynamics given by
Nt+1 = n
III(nt 1)Nt; (33)
where the initial conditionNt0 is obtained from (25). Population keeps either shrinking or expanding
in the long run, depending on the steady-state fertility rate.
4.3.3 Technological Progress
The results above demonstrate that nRt ; n
P
t ; h
R
t+1 and h
P
t+1 depend only on e
G
t in period t  t0.
Furthermore, because nRt = n
P
t the group ratio is stationary over Stage III; i.e., qt+1 = qt0  q
8t  t0; where qt0 is given by (25). It then follows from (17) that the aggregate level of e¢ ciency
39Since (eGt ) > e^  eGt in (28),
nt <
T
 + e^  eGt
8t  t0;
where eGt 2 ( ; ) as shown by (26). This shows that nt < 1 if the di¤erence e^   is su¢ ciently large, for example.
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labor Ht+1 becomes
Ht+1 = (1  )TNtnt[qhRt+1 + (1  q)hPt+1]  HIII(eGt ; Nt); (34)
where HIII1 (e
G
t ; Nt) > 0 and H
III
2 (e
G
t ; Nt) > 0 8(eGt ; Nt)  0. The rst property is because a rise
in eGt increases n
i
th
i
t+1, and the second property reects the scale e¤ect.
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Substituting (34) into (18), the evolution of technology in Stage III is
At+1 = [1 + g(Ht+1)]At  GIII(eGt ; Nt)At; (35)
where the initial value At0 is obtained from (25), and the sequence feGt ; Ntg1t=t0 is fully determined
by (29), (30) and (33). Since eGt >  for all t  t0; the growth rate of technology in this stage
is higher than in the previous stages, as long as population keeps growing. However, such rapid
growth may not be sustainable in the long run, depending on the demographic trend.
Proposition 3 (Economic Growth Slowdown) If (A1)(A4) are satised and nt = nIII(nt) <
1; the growth rate of technology, gt; converges toward zero in the long run.
Proof. Proposition 2 and (33) reveal that under the conditions above, the adult population Nt
declines towards zero over Stage III. Since (35) shows that g(0) = 0 if Nt = 0; gt converges toward
zero in the long run. 
The ultimate population extinction implied by this proposition does not appear to be quite
implausible, considering the current fertility rates of industrial economies.41 Nevertheless, the
long-run result needs to be interpreted carefully since it is based on the political system (26).
Rather than o¤ering an accurate prediction, the proposition alerts the possibility of economic
growth slowdown in the presence of political bias: If public policies excessively reect the opinions
of the elderly, aging economies will underinvest in young generations, who will be the main labor
force in the future.
In order to avoid such a miserable consequence, the government needs to be impartial between
generations. By allocating a fair budget to public education, the government is able to lighten
40Substituting (zit) = ; e
i
t = (e
G
t ) and (28) into (7) yields the indirect utility function of (e
G
t ; z
i
t): Then the
envelope theorem reveals that the indirect utility function is strictly increasing in eGt : Moreover, as implied by (8);
consumption cit is constant for any e
G
t : Thus recalling  = ; one nds that n
i
th
i
t+1 increases with e
G
t .
41For example, a French demographer Bourgeois-Pichat estimates that the population of European countries would
die out within 300 years if their fertility rates were and remained the West German level (Johnson et al., 1989).
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the householdsburden on education, (eGt ); and thereby encourage childbirth. Equally important,
these e¤ects can be augmented by improving the e¢ ciency of education policy.42 Therefore, with
a high level of quantity and quality, public education works as a substitute for private education,
and as an e¤ective means of preventing population decline.
5 Concluding Remarks
This research has unveiled the crucial role played by public education in the transition to aging
societies since the early Industrial Revolution. In the early phases of Industrial Revolution, skill in-
vestment is undesirable for the masses, and compulsory education worked as a child labor regulation
that discouraged childbirth. On the other hand, in the later phases of the Industrial Revolution,
public education began to be viewed as a desirable service that assists householdschild rearing.
Nevertheless, it appears that public education may have been undersupplied in the postwar aging
countries.
The theory developed in this paper demonstrates that advanced economies may have poor
growth performance through a vicious cycle between population aging and the deterioration of
education policy. In order to make an escape from this cycle and sustain national pension systems,
policymakers should aim to prevent the allocation of national resources from being biased to a
particular age cohort. Furthermore, they need to carefully examine whether the budgets allocated
to public education are being used e¢ ciently. Without their dedicated e¤orts, public education
would not be an e¤ective substitute for private education, and thus fail to encourage childbirth.
The theoretical foundation behind these arguments is that education policy stimulates individ-
ualsincentives for childbirth as well as for skill investment. By taking this two-sided e¤ect into
account, one nds that education policy may be more productive than other policies, such as child
benets, for the purpose of enhancing human capital at the national level. Future research should
be directed at investigating this potential superiority of public education.
42To see this, consider public education investment in e¢ ciency units, denoted as teGt ; where t measures how
e¢ ciently eGt is invested: for instance, it depends on the allocation of e
G
t between facilities and teachers. In this case
the level of private education in Stage III is eit = (te
G
t ):
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Appendix 1 Technical Discussions
The Local Optimality Conditions for Private Education
This section discusses the case that zit  z and thus (zit) =  > 0 in (3). Substituting (8) into
the objective function (7) yields the (partially) indirect utility function that depends on eit; e
G
t and
zit: The sign of the rst derivative of this function with respect to e
i
t is determined by the sign of
D(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) 
8<: Dl(eit; eGt ; zit) if eit + eGt < e^;Dh(eit; eGt ) if eit + eGt > e^;
where
Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t)  h1(eit; eGt )[ + eit   !(eit; eGt ; zit)]  [1  !1(eit; eGt ; zit)]h(eit; eGt );
Dh(eit; e
G
t )  h1(eit; eGt )( + eit)  h(eit; eGt ):
For analytical convenience, the domain of Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) is dened as

l  f(eit; eGt ; zit) 2 R3+ : eit + eGt  e^ and zit  zg:
Noting the properties of !() in (5) and h() in (6), one obtains
Dl1(e
i
t; e
G
t ; z
i
t) < 0;
limzit!1D
l(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) = D
h(eit; e
G
t ) > D
l(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t);
(36)
for (eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) 2 
l. On the other hand, Dh(eit; eGt ) is dened on R2+ and has properties such that,
8(eit; eGt )  0;
Dh1 (e
i
t; e
G
t ) < 0; D
h
2 (e
i
t; e
G
t ) < 0; lim
eit!1
Dh(eit; e
G
t ) < 0: (37)
In order to prove the last property in (37), note that
@
@eit

h(eit; e
G
t )
h1(eit; e
G
t )

> 1:
Thus it follows that
lim
eit!1

( + eit) 
h(eit; e
G
t )
h1(eit; e
G
t )

< 0:
The properties with respect to eit are depicted by the upper panel of Figure 2. The two solid
curves indicate Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) and D
h(eit; e
G
t ); respectively, for a given e
G
t and z
i
t = z
low. They
are both negatively-sloped and are disconnected at eit = e^   eGt ; where the wage function !() is
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kinked. The corresponding utility level is shown by the solid curve in the lower panel. The curve
is continuous and kinked at eit = e^  eGt : Furthermore, its slope is positive where D(eit; eGt ; zi) > 0;
and is negative where D(eit; e
G
t ; z
i) < 0: These properties establish the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For an adult individual with zit  z, a level of private education, eit; is at least locally
optimal if (a) D(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) = 0 and e
i
t > 0 or (b) D(e
i
t; e
G
t ; z
i
t)  0 and eit = 0:
Proof of Lemma 1
(a) 0  eGt  e^: Since (A1) is equivalent to Dh(e^; e^) > 0; the properties of Dh() in (37) reveal that
Dh(e^  eGt ; eGt ) > 0 8eGt 2 [0; e^]:
Using (37) again, one nds that there exists a unique value eit > e^   eGt such that Dh(eit; eGt ) = 0:
Thus as depicted by Figure 2, the curve Dh(eit; e
G
t ) crosses the horizontal line at a unique point
above e^  eGt :
(b) eGt > e^: The results in case (a), along with (37), imply that there exists a unique e
i
t  0 such
that Dh(eit; e
G
t )  0; with equality if eit > 0:
Cases (a)(b) show that there exists a single-valued function (eGt )  0 such that
Dh((eGt ); e
G
t )  0; (eGt ) + eGt > e^;
where the equality holds if (eGt ) > 0: In light of Lemma 5, (e
G
t ) is the optimal level of private
education at least on the interval where D(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) = D
h(eit; e
G
t ).
Furthermore, applying the Implicit Function Theorem and noting (37), one obtains
0(eGt ) =  
h12(e
i
t; e
G
t )( + e
i
t)  h2(eit; eGt )
h11(eit; e
G
t )( + e
i
t)
< 0;
where eit = (e
G
t ) > 0: Lastly, 
0(eGt )  0 if (eGt ) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2
(a) 0  eGt  e^: Using (36)(37) with (A1),
lim
zit!1
Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) = D
h(eit; e
G
t ) > 0 8eit 2 [0; e^  eGt ]:
This result is shown by Figure 2. As zit increases to z
high and further, the curve Dl(eit; e
G
t ; z
i
t) in
the upper panel shifts upward, approaching the upper bound Dh(eit; e
G
t ). Correspondingly, the
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(partially indirect) utility function in the lower panel has a strictly positive slope on [0; e^ eGt ). On
the other hand, the proof of Lemma 1 shows that (eGt ) is the optimal level of private education at
least on the interval (e^  eGt ;1). Since the utility function is continuous on [0;1) in the diagram,
one nds that (eGt ) is globally optimal.
(b) eGt > e^: The proof of Lemma 1 shows that (e
G
t ) is the optimal level of private education
on the interval [0;1): This directly proves the global optimality of (eGt ). 
Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting qt+1 = nRt qt=nt into the expression of nt+1   nt obtained from (16),
nt+1   nt =
 
nRt+1
nt
  1
!
qtn
R
t +
 
nPt+1
nt
  1
!
(1  qt)nPt ;
where qt  q0 < 1 for t 2 [0; t] because of (21). Furthermore, in light of (16) and (20),
nit =
T
   w=aiAt ;
nt
nit+1
= qt
   w=aiAt+1
   w=aRAt + (1  qt)
   w=aiAt+1
   w=At ;
for t 2 [0; t   1); where aR > aP = 1 and At+1  At > w= because of (18) and (A3). Therefore,
as At+1 (and thus At) approaches w= from above, nPt goes to innity and n
P
t+1=nt becomes greater
than unity, while nRt and n
R
t+1=nt remain nite. In this case nt+1   nt goes to innity. 
Proof of Lemma 4
Note thatHt+1 > (1 )TNPt+1 in (17). Furthermore, (20) and (24) imply thatNPt+1 = nPt NPt > NPt
for t 2 [0; t0): Then it follows from (18) that the growth rate of technology has a lower bound such
that
gt+1 > g
min  g((1  )TNP0 ) > 0 t 2 [0; t0);
where NP0 = (1   q0)N0 > 0 under (A3). Using this result with (24) and (28) reveals that,
8t 2 [t; t0);
nPt+1 <
T
   wl()=[(1 + gmin)Ath(0; )] < n
P
t ;
where, in light of (25); At and nPt are independent of qt+1 and qt (> qt+1): On the other hand, (16)
shows that nPt approaches nt as qt goes to zero. Thus, the relationship n
P
t+1 < n
P
t above implies
that nt+1 < nt if qt (and thus qt+1) is su¢ ciently small in period t 2 [t; t0): 
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Proof of Equation (31)
As follows from (16); (24) and (32), a su¢ cient condition for nt0 < nt0 1 is
T
 + ()
 qt0 1 T
 + ()
+ (1  qt0 1) T
   !min ;
where !min  !(0;  ; z) < !(0;  ; zPt0 1) because zPt < z 8t 2 [0; t0). Solving the expression
above for qt0 1 yields
qt0 1 

1     !
min
 + ()

1     !
min
 + ()
 1
 qmax;
where ()  () and thus qmax 2 (0; 1]: Note that the condition qt0 1  qmax is satised under
(A3) because, as shown in Section 4, qt+1  qt 8t  0. 
Appendix 2 Data Sources
Figure 1 (Japan)
 Old-age related benets (Koreisha Kankei Kyufuhi) are obtained from the National Institute
of Population and Social Security Research (2007, p. 102).
 The number and the percentage of the population aged 65 and above are published by the
Japanese Statistics Bureau. The data for 19732000 and 20012004, respectively, are obtained
from the following websites:
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/wagakuni/index.htm
http://www.stat.go.jp/data/jinsui/2004np/index.htm#05k16-b
 Public expenditures for national schools are recorded on the special account budgets (revised)
of scal years 19732003 as Kokuritsu Daigaku, and on the General Account budget (re-
vised) of 2004 as Kokuritsu Daigaku Hojin Uneihi.43 The whole data are published online
by the Ministry of Finance Japan. Besides, the data for 19732000 are compiled in the electric
le Kokuritsu Gakko Tokubetsu Kaikei (98)by the Research Institute for Higher Education
of Hiroshima University. Their respective URLs are:
http://www1.mof.go.jp/data/index.htm
http://rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/data_list.php?%20-%2035
43The di¤erence in the budget sources is due to the incorporation of national universities in 2004.
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 The number of students enrolled in national universities and graduate schools is obtained
from the le Zaigakushasu (2)available at the Hiroshima Universitys website listed above.
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Figure 1. Population Aging and Generational Bias in Public Spending: Japan, 19732004
Notes: OLD AGE = old-age related benets per person aged 65 and above. UNIVERSITY =
public expenditures for national schools (mostly university) per student. OLD SHARE = the share
of the population aged 65 and above.
Sources: See Appendix 2.
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Figure 2. The Determination of Private Education for it =  > 0
Notes: The diagram depicts the decision of private education by an adult individual who cares
about the utility in elderhood. There may exist multiple local optima, depending on the levels of
public education eGt and parental potential income z
i
t. Given a su¢ ciently large amount of z
i
t; the
individual spends (eGt ) > 0 units of time per child on education.
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Figure 3. The Evolution of Fertility in Stage III
Notes: The diagram shows that fertility declines monotonically over Stage III, converging to a
nontrivial stationary-state equilibrium. The long-run fertility rate may or may not be lower than
unity (the critical level for stationary population), depending on how private education reacts to
undersupplied public education.
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